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Abstract
This work addresses the problem of verifying that untrusted storage behaves like
valid storage.. The problem is important in a system such as a network file system or
database where a client accesses data stored remotely on an untrusted server. Past
systems have used a hash tree-based checker to check the integrity of data stored on
untrusted storage. This method has high overhead as the tree must be traversed on
each load or store operation. In the offline approach, developed by Clarke et al. in
[6], multiset hashes are used to verify a sequence of load and store operations. The
overhead of this scheme is very low if checks are infrequent, but can be quite high if
checks are performed frequently. The hybrid scheme combines the advantages of the
two schemes and is efficient in most real world situations.
The various schemes were implemented on top of Berkeley DB, an embedded
database. Real world performance measurements were taken using OpenLDAP, a
lightweight directory service, which relies heavily on Berkeley DB. All read and writes
to the database were replaced with secure read and secure write operations. Using the
DirectoryMark LDAP test suite, the online scheme had an overhead of 113% when
compared to the an unmodified server, while the offline scheme with infrequent checks
(T=50000) resulted in 39% fewer DOPS. The offline scheme, however, outperformed
the online scheme by 31%, while the hybrid scheme outperformed the online scheme by
only 19%. In the worst case, when checks were frequent (T=500), the hybrid scheme
was 185% slower (65% fewer DOPS) than the online scheme. With frequent checks,
the offline scheme was 101% slower (50% fewer DOPS) than the online scheme.
Thesis Supervisor: Srinivas Devadas
Title: Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In today's networked world, users are increasingly trying to protect against attacks
from malicious adversaries. Large, remote, untrusted storage devices may be used
to house vast quantities of information. Ensuring that the data retrieved has been
stored correctly and has not been tampered with is a real-world problem. Previous
schemes of protecting the integrity of untrusted storage have relied on computationally
intensive algorithms relying on collision-resistant cryptographically secure hash trees.
These schemes are expensive and can have a debilitating effect on performance. More
efficient algorithms are needed if widespread adoption of such techniques is expected.
Corporations frequently outsource their data storage needs to third-party vendors
without any guarantee that the data is in fact being stored securely. The remote
storage servers may be placed in locations such that they are vulnerable to physi-
cal attacks, hardware malfunctions, or software attacks by a malicious third party.
Databases containing corporate information, social security and credit card numbers,
medical records, and credit histories may all be stored remotely. It is imperative that
the integrity of such data be verified prior to its use.
Integrity verification schemes are not only applicable to databases, but also to file
systems and even a computer's memory. A computer's RAM may be untrusted and
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susceptible to attack. In applications such as certified execution, it is necessary to
ensure that the requested computation was executed correctly on the processor and
that the RAM behaved correctly. Tampering with memory can cause incorrect results
to be produced and may allow an adversary to circumvent protection mechanisms,
such as in DRM applications.
The goal of this thesis is to implement three different integrity verification schemes
to measure the amount of overhead incurred and gauge the relative performance
advantages of each scheme in a real-world application with real workloads.
1.2 Related Work
A number of systems have addressed the problem of verifying data stored on untrusted
storage. The Byzantine fault-tolerant system, BFS [4], relies on replication in order
to ensure the integrity of a network file system. BFS allows up to 1/3 of the servers
to be compromised, while still ensuring that any data read from the file system is
legitimate.
Other systems, such as SUNDR, do not require any replication, placing trust
requirements on the client side [14]. SUNDR and BFS also differ in their freshness
guarantees. SUNDR relies on large client-side caches and utilizes hash trees, which
are used to protect disk blocks at the file system level.
The OceanStore file system [1] assigns a unique "GUID" handle to each file. For
immutable files, the GUID is a collision-resistant cryptographic hash of the file's
contents. A client can verify the contents of the file using the GUID. For mutable
files, the GUID is the hash of a public key and username. The file's contents are
digitally signed with a private key corresponding to the GUID, which are mapped to
the file's name using SDSI. Unlike SUNDR which signs entire file systems, OceanStore
signs individual files and therefore may be susceptible to replay attacks.
SFSRO [8] provides secure read-only access to file systems without the use of
public key infrastructure. SFSRO replicates data on a number of untrusted servers,
and guarantees data integrity even if an adversary compromises any one of the read-
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only servers.
Maheshwari's TDB uses hash trees and a limited amount of trusted storage to
create a trusted database on untrusted storage [13]. TDB employs hash trees and
validates the database against a collision-resistant root hash kept in trusted storage.
1.3 Organization
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of three different
algorithms for verifying the integrity of untrusted storage. Chapters 3-5 examine the
three algorithms in greater detail. First, online and offline schemes are explored in
Chapters 3 and 4, followed by an examination of a hybrid scheme in Chapter 5.
Once we have familiarized ourselves with the three schemes, in Chapter 6, we take
a look at the implementation details and issues that arise when putting theory into
practice.
Chapter 7 analyzes the three schemes using real-world performance benchmarks.
Finally, we wrap things up in Chapter 8 with some concluding remarks and sugges-
tions for future research.
15
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Chapter 2
Integrity Verification Schemes
This thesis addresses the problem of verifying that untrusted storage behaves like
valid storage. Storage behaves like valid storage if the data value that a program
loads from a particular address is the same data that the program most recently
stored to that address. The problem is important in a system, such as a network file
system [14] or a database [13], where a client computer accesses data stored remotely
on an untrusted server.
Typically, systems use a hash tree-based checker to check the integrity of data
stored on the untrusted storage. A tree of hashes is maintained over the data, and
the root of the tree is kept in the client's protected store. On each store operation,
the path from the data leaf to the root is updated. On each load operation, the path
from the data leaf to the root is verified before the data is treated as valid. The
hash tree is used to check, after each load operation, whether the untrusted storage
performed correctly. Because of this, a checker which uses a hash tree is referred to
as an online checker.
In the offline approach, developed by Clarke et al. [6, 7, 18], the client uses
multiset hash functions [6] to efficiently log the minimum information necessary to
check its operations on the untrusted storage. Since only the minimum information
is collected at program runtime, the performance overhead of the scheme can be very
small and the offline scheme can be very efficient when integrity checks are performed
17
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Figure 2-1: A hybrid checker. There is an extra bit, called a STATUSBIT, associated
with each leaf node. STATUSBITs are always protected by the tree. If a leaf node's
STATUSBIT is 1, the data value is protected by the online scheme; if a leaf node's
STATUSBIT is 0, the data value is protected by the offline scheme.
infrequently. However, because the checker needs to read all the pages it used to
perform the check, the scheme can perform poorly if checks are frequent.
The online checker can be combined with the offline checker to create a hybrid
online-offline checker. This approach is illustrated in Figure 2-1.
In the hybrid approach, the checker maintains both a hash tree and the offline
multiset hashes and timer. Data is initially stored in the hash tree. When the client
wants to perform a particular computation on a subset of the data in the storage, it
can either work on the data in an online fashion using the tree, or it can take the
data out of the tree and work on it in an offline fashion. When the client performs
an intermediate offline check, the client only needs to read addresses that were used
since the last intermediate check, rather than having to read all of the addresses it
used since the beginning of execution. If the intermediate offline integrity check is
successful, data can then be returned to the tree. Per-address STATUSBITS are used
to identify whether a particular data value is protected by the online or offline scheme.
When the client works on data in an offline fashion, the hash tree acts as a
repository for the data values, while the offline scheme gives the client some work
space for it to perform its computation. To work on a subset of the data in the
18
storage, the client checks the data out of the repository and operates on it in the work
space. When the client has completed the computation, it checks the computation's
operations, and then exports the result of the computation. The client can then
deposit the data back into the repository.
The client can dynamically employ several strategies during its execution that
would maximize its performance. For example, the client may protect data it uses
regularly with the offline scheme and protect data it uses rarely using the hash tree,
thereby reducing the number of addresses that are read to perform an offline integrity
check. Alternatively, if the client will regularly be exporting results during some part
of its execution, the client can protect the data using the online scheme, which has
less overhead when integrity checks are frequent. If the client performs a computation
for which it will not export a result for some time, the data that is being used can
be moved to the offline scheme, which performs better when integrity checks are less
frequent.
The security of the offline and hybrid approaches have been proven by Clarke et
al. in [6]. A client using the hybrid checker is guaranteed to detect the attack if the
data value it; loads from an address is not the most recent value it stored to that
address.
In the following chapters, we take a closer look at each of the three schemes.
19
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Chapter 3
Online Scheme
The online scheme is referred to as such since the integrity of the untrusted storage
is verified after each load or store operation. The underlying data structure for the
online scheme is a hash tree, or Merkle tree [15]. In a hash tree, data is located at
the leaves of a tree. Each node contains a collision resistant hash of the data in the
child nodes. The root hash is stored in secure, tamper-resistant memory on the client
and is the only item which must be protected.
To check that a node or leaf in a hash tree has not been tampered with, on each
load operation, the path from the data leaf to the root is verified before the data is
treated as valid. On each store operation, the path from the data leaf to the root is
updated. Hash trees have been used for integrity checking in many systems such as
Duchamp, BFS, SFSRO, and TDB.
Clarke et al. describe the online algorithm in [6] as follows:
To check the integrity of a node in the tree, the checker:
1. reads the node and its siblings
2. concatenates their data together (a. P is the concatenation of strings a and /.)
3. hashes the concatenated data
4. checks that the resultant hash matches the hash in the parent.
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The steps are repeated on the parent node, and on its parent node, all the way to the
root of the tree.
To update a node in the tree, the checker:
1. authenticates the node's siblings via steps 1-4 described previously.
2. changes the data in the node, hashes the concatenation of this new data with
the siblings' data, and updates the parent to be the resultant hash. This step
must be performed in a manner which makes changes to the node and its parent
visible simultaneously (using the cache in the checker, say).
Again, the steps are repeated until the root is updated.
root = h(hl.h2)
hl =h
V¼ V2 V3 V4
Figure 3-1: A binary (m = 2) hash tree. Each internal node is a hash of the concate-
nation of the data in the node's children.
Hash trees allow individual data values in an arbitrarily large amount of data to be
checked and updated securely using a small, fixed-sized, trusted hash in the checker.
On each FSM load, the checker checks the path from the leaf, corresponding to the
address containing the data, to the trusted root. On each FSM store, the checker
updates the path from the leaf to the trusted root. The number of accesses to the
untrusted storage on each FSM load or store is logarithmic in the size of the storage.
If the trusted hash were calculated directly over the data set, the overhead on each
FSM load would be linear, because the entire storage would have to be read on each
load.
22
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With a balanced m-ary tree, the number of nodes to check on a FSM load is
logm(N), where N is the number of leaves of data to be protected. If the checker
frequently adds and deletes data values from the tree, steps may have to be taken to
ensure that the tree remains balanced to maintain this logarithmic overhead.
If the size of a leaf is the size of a hash, an m-ary hash tree allows integrity
verification with a per-bit space overhead of about ml 1 bits. For example, in [9], a
4-ary hash tree is used, with the lowest level hashes computed over 64-byte data value
blocks. Each hash is 128 bits (MD5 [17] is used for the hashes).
23
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Chapter 4
Offline Scheme
The offline scheme was developed by Clarke et al. in [6] as an alternative to the
online tree-based scheme described above. This scheme is an extension of Blum's
offline memory correctness checking scheme [2] and is able to detect attacks by active
adversaries. Clarke et al. introduce the incremental multiset hash as the underlying
cryptographic tool for all offline operations. Building on the notion of bag integrity
checking, Clarke et al. use this primitive to build cryptographically secure integrity
checking schemes for random access memories and disks. In addition, Clarke et al.
also introduce a hybrid checker which combines the advantages of both the online
and offline schemes. The hybrid checker will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
The remainder of this chapter and the next contain an abbreviated explanation of
the offline and hybrid schemes, excerpted from [6, 7] by Clarke et al. A more detailed
treatment, including proofs and additional information on multiset hashes, can be
found in [6, 7].
4.1 Introduction
The offline approach is used to check whether untrusted storage performed correctly
after a sequence of operations is performed. The benefit of this approach is that there
is a constant overhead on the number of storage accesses on each program load or
25
store.
Offline integrity checking can be particularly efficient in an application like cer-
tified execution. In certified execution, a program is run on a processor, and the
processor produces a certificate proving that the computation was carried out in an
authentic manner on the processor and that the program produced a particular set of
results. In the application, the processor needs to know, at the end of the program's
execution, whether the RAM performed correctly. However, in the case the check
fails, it is not necessary to know which particular operation malfunctioned, or which
stored value was tampered with. Certifying executions can be important in applica-
tions like distributed computation, where an expensive computation is carried out by
several networked computers in a highly distributed manner. The person requesting
the computation must have some assurances that, when he receives results, the results
are of authentic program executions.
Offline integrity checking can also be useful in memory-constrained devices, since
a hash tree is not required and the memory checking code and its resources (stack
and heap) can be smaller. There is some space overhead to store time stamps, but it
is typically smaller than the overhead of storing a tree of hashes.
4.2 Model
In our model, there is a checker that keeps and maintains some small, fixed-sized,
trusted state. The untrusted storage is arbitrarily large. The finite state machine (FSM)
generates loads and stores and the checker updates its trusted state on each FSM load
or store to the untrusted storage. The checker uses its trusted state to verify the in-
tegrity of the untrusted storage. The trusted computing base (TCB) consists of the
FSM, and the checker with its trusted state. For example, the FSM could be a proces-
sor. The checker would be special hardware that is added to the processor to detect
tampering in the external memory.
The checker checks if the untrusted storage behaves correctly, i.e., like valid stor-
age. Storage behaves like valid storage if the data value that the checker reads from a
26
particular address is the same data value that the checker had most recently written
to that address. In our model, the untrusted storage is assumed to be actively con-
trolled by an adversary. The untrusted storage may not behave like valid storage if
the storage has malfunctioned because of errors, or if it has been somehow altered by
the adversary.
For this problem, a simple solution such as calculating a message authentication
code (MAC) of the data value and address, writing the (data value, MAC) pair
to the address, and using the MAC to check the data value on each read, does
not work. The approach does not prevent replay attacks: an adversary can replace
the (data value, MAC) pair currently at an address with a different pair that was
previously written to the address. The essence of an offline checker is that a "log"
of the sequence of FSM operations is maintained in fixed-sized trusted state in the
checker.
4.3 Bag Integrity Checking
We introduce bag integrity checking as our primitive for thinking about offline in-
tegrity checking. The scenario consists of the checker and a bag. The bag is the
untrusted storage and the checker performs two operations on the bag:
* put: the checker puts an item into the bag
* take: the checker takes an item out of the bag.
The checker is interested in whether the bag behaves correctly. A bag behaves
correctly if it behaves as a valid bag, a bag in which the sequence of puts and takes
performed by the checker is a valid history for the bag (i.e., only the checker has
manipulated the bag with put and take operations).
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The checker's fixed-sized state is:
Figure 4-1: Bag Offline Integrity Checking
4.3.1 Checker with Multiset Hashes and Time stamps
This solution is described in Figure 4-11. The checker maintains multiset hashes and
has a counter. The checker increments the counter each time it puts a set of items2
into the bag, and appends the new value of the counter (a time stamp) to each item
'We assume that take(P) is a deterministic function that removes all of the items in the bag
that match predicate P and returns them to the caller; take(true) removes all of the items currently
in the bag and returns them to the caller.
2 Recall that, in a set, each element is distinct.
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* 2 multiset hashes: PUTHASH and TAKEHASH. Initially both multiset hashes
are 0:
* 1 counter: TIMER. Initially TIMER is 0.
* 1 flag: ERROR. Initially ERROR is false.
put(7,) puts a set of items Is into the bag:
1. Increment TIMER.
2. For each item CE I, put the pair, (item, TIMER), into the bag.
3. For each item E IS, update PUTHASH: PUTHASH
+,= hash((item, TIMER)).
take(P) takes the multiset of items that match the predicate P from the bag:
1. Take all pairs that match P from the bag.
2. If, for any pair, (item, T), we have T>TIMER, then set ERROR to true.
3. update TAKEHASH: TAKEHASH +,= hash((item, T)).
check() returns true if, (i) the bag has behaved correctly (as a valid bag) and,
(ii) the bag is empty, according to the bag's history of accesses:
1. If PUTHASH -, TAKEHASH is false or ERROR is true then return
false.
2. Reset TIMER to zero (this is an optimization).
3. Return true.
as it puts it into the bag. When the checker takes a multiset of items from the bag,
for each item, it checks that the time stamp on the item is less than or equal to the
current value} of the counter.
The time stamp is included with the item when the multiset hashes are updated.
The checker uses time stamps to help check that items it takes from the bag have
been put into the bag by the checker at an earlier time.
Note that the put pairs that are added to PUTHASH are added by the checker and
thus, we are guaranteed that they will form a set. The adversary can control the take
pairs, and thus, take pairs can be duplicated. The set-collision resistance property
implies that it is computationally infeasible to find a multiset of take pairs different
from the set of put pairs that will result in PUTHASH being equal to TAKEHASH at
the end of an integrity check.
The FSM uses the checker as an interface to the bag. The checker performs the put
and take operations for the FSM as described in Figure 4-1. When the FSM wants to
check the integrity of the bag, it tells the checker to take all of the items out of the bag
(take(true)). At this point, the FSM performs a checker check operation. The check
operation returns true if all of the time stamp checks have passed and PUTHASH is
equal to TAKEHASH. If the check operation returns true, the FSM knows that the
bag has behaved correctly and is empty (according to the bag's history of accesses).
So, by asking the checker to compare the put hash and the take hash, the FSM
determines whether the bag's history is valid.
With the checker's put and take operational primitives, we can build more complex
operations for more complex data structures. Section 4.4 demonstrates how this can
be done for random access storages, such as RAM and disks.
4.4 Integrity Checking of Random Access Storage
In Section 4.3, we developed a bag checker. It makes a checkable bag from an untrusted
bag. Its interface is made of three functions: put(S), which places all the elements in
the set S into the untrusted bag; take(P), which takes all the elements that match
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predicate P from the untrusted bag; check() which returns true if and only if the
untrusted bag has behaved correctly and is empty according to its history of accesses
(i.e., if PUTHASH - TAKEHASH and all the time stamp checks passed).
We now show how a checked bag can be used to create checked random access stor-
age (RAS). We call this algorithm the offline algorithm because checks are performed
after a sequence of storage accesses, rather than on each storage access.
Definition 1. Checked Random Access Storage is a primitive that provides the fol-
lowing interface: store(a,v) stores data value v at address a. load(a) returns the
data value that is stored at address a. checkRAS() returns true if and only if for each
address a and each load from a, the load returned the data value that was most
recently placed by store at address a.
Figure 4-2 shows how to produce checked random access storage from a checked
bag. Essentially, the random access storage is simulated by placing (address, data value)
pairs in a checked bag. Therefore we must maintain the invariant, which we term
the RAS invariant, that there is always exactly one pair in the bag for each address,
according to the bag checker's operations on the bag. During initialization, a pair is
placed in the bag for each address. To perform a load, the pair for the desired address
is taken from the bag, inspected, and then put back into the bag (to maintain the
RAS invariant). To perform a store, the pair previously in the bag for that address
is taken from the bag, and replaced by the new pair. To check the bag, we empty it
into a fresh bag, and once the old bag is empty, we check it before throwing it out.
In real life, the untrusted bag that the checked bag is based on is actually im-
plemented with some untrusted random access storage (RAM or block storage for
example). This untrusted bag is being accessed by the bag checker when we access
the checked bag. Takes and puts of (address, data value) pairs to the checked bag
result in takes and puts of (address, data value, time stamp) triples to the untrusted
bag. If the untrusted bag behaves correctly, the invariant that there is exactly one
(address, data value) pair per address carries over to (address, data value, time stamp)
triples in the untrusted bag. Therefore, it is possible to implement the untrusted bag
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Let Pa be a predicate that returns true on a pair (a', v) for which a = a'. To pro-
duce checked random access storage, we use a checked bag, in which we will place (ad-
dress, data value) pairs. We will arrange to always have exactly one pair per address in
the bag, according to the bag checker's operations on the bag. Therefore, we will assume
that take(Pa) always returns exactly one pair (we can add an explicit check for this and
set an ERROR flag if this does not happen).
Initialization the bag must be filled at startup.
1. put(S) into the checked bag, where S is a set of (address, data value) pairs
that represents the initial state of the checked random access storage.
store(a, v) stores v at address a in the checked random access storage.
1. take(Pa) on the checked bag.
2. put(a, v) into the checked bag.
load(a) loads the data value at address a from the checked random access storage.
1. (., v) =take(Pa) on the checked bag.
2. put(a, v) into the checked bag.
3. Return v to the caller.
checkRAS() returns true if and only if the storage has behaved correctly up until now.
1. Create a temporary checked bag T (call the current checked bag B).
2. S =take(true) from B.
3. If check() on B is false, then return false (the check failed).
4. put(S) into T.
5. B = T.
6. Return true.
Note that steps 2 and 4 involve a set S that is huge. In an actual implementation,
we would merge both steps, putting items into T as soon as they were removed
from B.
Figure 4-2: Offline integrity checking of random access storage using a checked bag
using untrusted random access storage by storing (address, data value, time stamp)
triples as (data value, time stamp) pairs stored at an address that is proportional to
the address from the triple.
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Unfortunately, when we implement the untrusted bag using untrusted random
access storage, we implicitly limit the range that the time stamp can take. Conse-
quently, it will be necessary to call checkRAS on the checked random access storage
each time the time stamp reaches its maximum value. When checkRAS replaces the
checked bag that is in use by a fresh one, we replace the high time stamp from the
old bag by a low one in the new bag.
The advantage of this offline RAS checker over an integrity checker using a hash
tree is that there is a constant overhead per FSM load and store, as compared with the
logarithmic overhead of using a hash tree. However, the offline approach does require
that all of the addresses that the FSM used be read whenever an integrity check
is desired. (In Section 5, we optimize this requirement with a hybrid online-offline
approach.)
In the following subsections, we explore the implementation issues involved in
checking dynamically-changing, sparsely-populated address spaces.
4.4.1 Dynamically-changing address space
Thus far, we have looked at the problem of checking the integrity of fixed-sized RAS.
However, in practice, it is often desirable to check a RAS with a dynamically-changing,
sparsely-populated, address space.
To enable a dynamically-changing address space, we augment the RAS interface
with two methods: add(S), and remove(a). add(S) calls put(S) to put, S, a set
of (address, data value) pairs, into the bag; remove(a) calls take(Pa) on the bag.
Moreover, we arrange to set an ERROR flag if take(Pa) does not return a singleton
set, as was assumed in Figure 4-2; if the ERROR flag is set, checkRAS returns false3 .
The augmented interface is shown in Figure 4-3.
If, during the FSM's execution, the FSM wishes to increase its address space (for
example, when the program increases its heap size), the FSM calls add on the new
3In an actual implementation, if the FSM performs an operation that causes take to be performed
on an address that is not in the bag, an entry that is not currently in the bag is read from the
RAS. Therefore check will return false, and thus, checkRAS will return false. Also, in an actual
implementation, take(Pa) will not return a set or multiset with two or more elements.
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add(S) adds S, a set of (address, data value) pairs, to the address space.
1. put(S) into the checked bag.
remove(a) removes address a from the address space.
1. take(Pa) on the checked bag.
store(a, v) stores v at address a in the checked random access storage.
1. take(Pa) on the checked bag.
2. put(a, v) into the checked bag.
load(a) loads the data value at address a from the checked random access storage.
1. (, v) =take(Pa) on the checked bag.
2. put(a, v) into the checked bag.
3. REteturn v to the caller.
checkRAS() returns true if and only if the storage has behaved correctly up until now.
1. Create a temporary checked bag T (call the current checked bag B).
2. M =take(true) from B.
3. If check() on B is false, then return false (the check failed).
4. If check returned true, it means a set, as opposed to a multiset, of (a, v)
pairs was read in step 2. Thus, we refer to this set as S. add(S) into T.
5. 13 = T.
6. Rleturn true.
Note that steps 2 and 4 involve a set S that is huge. In an actual implementation,
we would merge both steps, putting items into T as soon as they were removed
from B3.
Also, if take(P) does not return a singleton set, an ERROR flag is set; if the
ERROR flag is set, checkRAS returns false.
Figure 4-3: Offline integrity checking of random access storage on a dynamically-
changing, sparsely-populated, address space
addresses. The FSM can then store and load from the larger address space. If, during
the FSM's execution, the FSM wants to decrease its address space, the FSM calls
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remove on each of the addresses that will no longer be used. The FSM then stores
and loads from the smaller address space. Only the addresses in the FSM's current
address space are traversed during a checkRAS operation. This approach for checking
the integrity of a dynamically-changing address space is much simpler than checking
the integrity of the space using a hash tree, which could require re-balancing the tree.
As we are now considering sparsely-populated address spaces, we re-define the
RAS invariant to be that, according to the bag checker's operations on the bag, no
put operation is performed on an address that is already present in the bag, and no
take operation is performed on an address that is not present in the bag. It is possible
for the FSM to use the checked RAS in a way that is not well-defined (by adding
the same address twice, for example). Therefore, we will be particularly interested
in FSMs whose implementations always maintain the RAS invariant on correctly-
behaving RAS. We call this property the FSM requirement. The FSM maintains
whatever data structures it needs to meet the FSM requirement4 in either trusted or
checked storage. We note that if the FSM requirement is met and the bag behaves
like a valid bag, then the RAS invariant is maintained.
The addresses the FSM uses may be any arbitrary subset of the addresses in
the storage. When an untrusted bag is implemented using RAS, as described in the
beginning of Section 4.4, where (address, data value, time stamp) triples are stored
as (data value, time stamp) pairs, there is the issue of determining which addresses
to read in step 2 of a checkRAS function call. Implicitly, it is the untrusted bag's
job to keep track of these addresses. As an example, the bag could use a bitmap (an
extra bit per address) to keep track of the addresses the FSM uses5 . We note that
the bitmap does not have to be protected because it is an internal structure to the
untrusted bag: check() returns true if and only if the untrusted bag has behaved
correctly and is empty according to its history of accesses.
4For example, the pointer to the top of the heap.
5If the offline scheme is used to protect a process's virtual memory space, this bitmap could be
the valid bits in a page table; in this case, addresses would be added or removed from the address
space a page at a time.
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4.5 Improved Offline Checker
We now take a look at a slightly modified version of the offline checker. In this
improved checker, the TIMER is not incremented on every load and store operation.
Rather, the 'TIMER is incremented only on each put operation, allowing time stamps
to be smaller without increasing the frequency of checks.
Figure 4-4 shows the basic put and get operations that are used internally in the
checker. Figure 4-5 shows the interface the FSM calls to use the offline checker to
check the integrity of the memory.
In Figure 4-4, the checker maintains two multiset hashes and a counter. In mem-
ory, each data value is accompanied by a time stamp. Each time the checker performs
a put operation, it appends the current value of the counter (a time stamp) to the data
value, and writes the (data value, time stamp) pair to memory. When the checker
performs a get operation, it reads the pair stored at an address, and, if necessary,
updates the counter so that it is strictly greater than the time stamp that was read.
The multiset hashes are updated (+,) with (a, v, t) triples corresponding to the pairs
written or read from memory.
Figure 4-5 shows how the checker implements the store-load interface. To ini-
tialize the RAM, the checker puts an initial value to each address. When the FSM
performs a store operation, the checker gets the original value at the address, then
puts the new value to the address. When the FSM performs a load operation, the
checker gets the original value at the address and returns this value to the FSM; it
then puts the same value back to the address. To check the integrity of the RAM at
the end of a sequence of FSM stores and loads, the checker gets the value at each
address, then compares WRITEHASH and READHASH. If WRITEHASH is equal to
READHASH, the checker concludes that the RAM has been behaving correctly.
Because the checker checks that WRITEHASH is equal to READHASH, substitution
(the RAM returns a value that is never written to it) and replay (the RAM returns a
stale value instead of the one that is most recently written) attacks on the RAM are
prevented. The purpose of the time stamps is to prevent reordering attacks in which
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Figure 4-4: put and get operations
RAM returns a value that has not yet been written so that it can subsequently return
stale data. Suppose we consider the put and get operations that occur on a particular
address as occurring on a timeline. Line 3 in the get operation ensures that, for each
store and load operation, each write has a time stamp that is strictly greater than
all of the time stamps previously read from memory. Therefore, the first time an
adversary tampers with a particular (data value, time stamp) pair that is read from
memory, there will not be an entry in the WRITEHASH matching the adversary's
entry in the READHASH, and that entry will not be added to the WRITEHASH at a
later time.
The TIMER is not solely under the control of the checker, and is a function of what
is read from memory, which is untrusted. Therefore, the WRITEHASH cannot be
guaranteed to be over a set. For example, for a sequence of store and load operations
occurring on the same address, an adversary can decrease the time stamp that is
stored in memory and have triples be added to the WRITEHASH multiple times. The
READHASH can also not be guaranteed to be over a set because the adversary controls
the pairs that are read from memory. Thus, set-collision resistance is not sufficient,
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The checker's fixed-sized state is:
* 2 multiset hashes: WRITEHASH and READHASH. Initially both hashes are 0.
* 1 counter: TIMER. Initially TIMER is 0.
put(a, v) writes a value v to address a in memory:
1. Let t be the current value of TIMER. Write (v, t) to a in memory.
2. Update WRITEHASH: WRITEHASH +7-= hash(a, v, t).
get(a) reads the value at address a in memory:
1. Read (v, t) from a in memory.
2. Update READHASH: READHASH +,= hash(a, v, t).
3. TIMER = max(TIMER, t + 1).
_ _
Figure 4-5: Offline integrity checking of random access memory
and we require multiset-collision resistant hash functions.
The original offline checker differs from the improved checker in that the TIMER is
incremented on each put operation and is not a function of what is read from memory.
The TIMER is solely under the control of the checker. This means that the pairs that
are used to update WRITEHASH form a set. Therefore set-collision resistance is
sufficient. Our offline checker improves on the original checker because TIMER is not
incremented on every load and store operation. Thus, time stamps can be smaller
without increasing the frequency of checks, which improves the performance of the
checker.
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initialize() initializes RAM.
1. put(a, 0) for each address a.
store(a,v) stores v at address a.
1. get(a).
2. put(a,v).
load(a) loads the data value at address a.
1. v = get(a). Return v to the caller.
2. put(a,v).
check() checks if the RAM has behaved correctly (at the end of operation).
1. get(a) for each address a.
2. If WRITEHASH is equal to READHASH, return true.
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Chapter 5
Hybrid Scheme
In Section 4.3, we constructed a checked bag, with the interface put(IZ), take(P),
and check()1 , from an underlying untrusted bag, whose interface was standard bag
put(Im) and take(P) operations2 . In Section 4.4, we used the checked bag to con-
struct a checked random access storage (RAS), with the interface add(S), remove(a),
store(a, v), load(a), and checkRAS()3 . We refer to the interface to the checked bag
as a bag checker and the interface to the checked RAS as an offline RAS checker
(offline checker).
In this section, we will introduce a hybrid RAS checker (hybrid checker), with the
operations:
hybrid-moveToOffline(a), hybrid-store(a, v), hybrid-load(a), and hybrid-checkRAS (Y).
Figure 2-1 illustrates a hybrid checker. To construct the hybrid checker, we use the
checked RAS, and a variant of the hash tree described in Chapter 3, which we call a
partial-hash tree. Partial-hash trees are described in Section 5.2.
1In this section, we will refer to these operations as cbag-put(I 5 ), cbag-take(P) and
cbag-check().
2In this section, we will refer to these operations as ubag-put(Im) and ubag-take(P); Im denotes
a multiset of itsems.
3In this section, we will refer to these operations as offline-add(S), offline-remove(a),
offline-store(a, v),
offline-load(a), and offline-checkRAS().
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online
0 , 1, 1 , 0 1, 0*
offline I 
time stamp time stamp time stamp
Figure 5-1: A hybrid checker. There is an extra bit, called a STATUSBIT, associated
with each leaf node. STATUSBITs are always protected by the tree. If a leaf node's
STATUSBIT is 1, the data value is protected by the online scheme; if a leaf node's
STATUSBIT is 0, the data value is protected by the offline scheme.
5.1 Motivation for the hybrid checker
One of the disadvantages of the offline checker in Section 4.4 is that all of the ad-
dresses that the FSM used since the beginning of its execution must be read during
each offline-checkRAS operation; otherwise, even if the RAS were behaving like
valid RAS, the underlying untrusted bag would not be empty and the cbag-check
operation would fail. This approach is feasible for RAM or small disks, but imprac-
tical for large-scale storage in file systems or databases. For large scale storage, it
is desirable to use a scheme in which the FSM would only need to read addresses it
used since the last integrity check when it is performing its current integrity check.
The second disadvantage of the offline checker is that, if integrity checks are fre-
quent, the offline checker can perform worse than the online checker, because of the
overhead it incurs reading the addresses it used since the beginning of its execution
to perform the integrity check. It is desirable to construct a checker which could take
advantage of the benefits of both the online and offline checkers; the FSM could use
this checker to maximize its performance during its execution.
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We propose using a hybrid RAS checker to address these issues. In the hybrid
approach, the checker maintains both a hash tree and the offline multiset hashes and
timer. Data is initially stored in the tree. The idea is that, when the FSM wants to
perform a particular computation on a subset of the data in the storage, it can either
work on the data in an online fashion using the tree, or it can take the data out of the
tree, and work on it in an offline fashion. When the FSM performs an intermediate
offline integrity check, the FSM only needs to read addresses that were used since the
last intermediate check, instead of having to read all of the addresses it used since
the beginning of its execution. If the intermediate offline integrity check is successful,
data can then be returned to the tree.
With respect to when the FSM works on data in an offline fashion, the hash tree
can be seen as acting as a repository for the data values, and the offline scheme gives
the FSM some work space for it to perform some computation. To work on a subset
of the data in. the storage, the FSM checks the data out of the repository and operates
on it in the work space. When the FSM has completed the computation, it checks
the computat;ion's operations, and then exports the result of the computation. The
FSM can then deposit the data back into the repository.
The FSM can dynamically employ several strategies during its execution that
would maximize its performance. As an example of a strategy the FSM might employ,
if there is data the FSM regularly uses and data it uses rarely, it can protect the data
it uses regularly with the offline scheme, and protect the data it uses rarely using the
hash tree; this can reduce the number of addresses that are read to perform an offline
integrity check. As a second example of an FSM strategy, if, during some part of its
execution, the FSM will be regularly exporting results, the FSM can protect the data
using the online scheme, which has a smaller overhead when integrity checks are very
frequent; if, during some other part of its execution, the FSM performs a computation
for which it will not export a result for some time, the data that is being used can
be moved to the offline scheme, which performs better when integrity checks are less
frequent.
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5.2 Partial-Hash Tree
Besides the checked RAS developed in Section 4.4, we also use a partial-hash tree to
develop the hybrid checker. A partial-hash tree is similar to a hash tree, except that
there is an extra bit associated with each leaf node (recall that the leaf nodes contain
data in a hash tree). The extra bit, which we refer to as a STATUSBIT, is always
protected by the tree.
If a leaf node's STATUSBIT is set (equal to '1'), the leaf node is protected by the
tree, and said to be 'present' in the tree. If a leaf node's STATUSBIT is not set (equal
to '0'), the leaf node is not protected by the tree, and is said to be 'not present' in
the tree.
The partial-hash tree interface has the following operations: pht-isAddressPresent(a),
pht-moveToTree(a, v), pht-moveFromTree(a), pht-store(a, v), and pht-load(a); the
interface is described in Figure 5-2. The operations pht-store(a, v), and pht-load(a)
simply call online-store(a, v), and online-load(a) respectively; online-store(a, v),
and online-load(a) are the hash tree store and load operations described in Chap-
ter 3.
Considering the layout of the tree, an address and its STATUSBIT can be protected
by the same hash when the address is present in the tree. When the address is not
present in the tree, the hash protects the STATUSBIT.
5.3 Hybrid Checker
The interface for the hybrid checker is shown in Figure 5-3. At first, we consider a
fixed-sized RAS. The operations are: hybrid-moveToOffline(a), hybrid-store(a, v),
hybrid-load(a), and hybrid-checkRAS(Y).
hybrid-moveToOffline(a) checks the integrity of the data value in address a
in the tree, and moves the data from the protection of the tree to the protection
of the offline scheme. hybrid-store(a, v) first reads (but does not check) a's STA-
TUSBIT in the partial-hash tree. If it is 1, it checks the STATUSBIT and performs
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pht-isAddressPresentInTree(a) returns true if and only if address a is present in the
tree.
1. check the integrity of the STATUSBIT pertaining to address a in the manner
described in Chapter 3.
2. if the STATUSBIT is 1, return true. If it is 0, return false.
pht-moveToTree(a, v) move address a to the partial-hash tree, and set its value to be v.
1. update the STATUSBIT pertaining to address a, in the manner described in
Chapter 3, to be 1.
2. update the appropriate nodes so that the leaf node for address a is protected
by the tree and has the value v. The nodes are updated in the manner
described in Chapter 3. (This step can be performed at the same time as the
previous step, so that the logarithmic cost of using the hash tree is incurred
once.)
pht-moveFromTree(a) remove address a from the partial-hash tree.
1. update the STATUSBIT pertaining to address a, in the manner described in
Chapter 3, to be 0.
2. update the appropriate nodes so that the internal nodes of the tree no longer
protect the leaf node for address a. The nodes are updated in the manner
described in Chapter 3. (This step can be performed at the same time as the
previous step, so that the logarithmic cost of using the hash tree is incurred
once.)
pht-store(a, v) stores v at address a.
1. online-store(a, v)
pht-load(a) loads the data value at address a.
1. v = online-load(a)
2. Return v to the caller.
Figure 5-2: Partial-hash tree
an online store; if it is 0, it performs an offline store. hybrid-load performs sim-
ilarly. hybrid-checkRAS(Y) checks the data protected by the offline scheme. Ad-
dresses specified in Y are moved back to the protection of the online scheme. If the
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offline-checkRAS call in hybrid-checkRAS returns true, hybrid-checkRAS returns
true; otherwise, hybrid-checkRAS returns false.
Compared with the checked RAS described in Section 4.4, the new adversarial
attack we must consider is that an adversary can change the STATUSBIT of an address
from 1 to 0 and alter the data value corresponding to the address in the offline scheme.
Because the STATUSBIT is not checked if it is 0, the FSM could do an offline load (or
offline store) on this value, when it should have done an online load (or online store).
However, it can be proven that this attack, and other attacks on the storage, will be
detected by the hybrid checker.
As described in Section 4.4.1, there is the issue of determining which addresses to
read in step 2 of the offline-checkRAS call in hybrid-checkRAS. Again, we argue
that it is the underlying untrusted bag's job to keep track of these addresses, and thus,
the data structures used to maintain this information do not have to be protected.
One possibility is to maintain an extra bit per hash tree node. These bits are all ini-
tially one. When an address is moved to the offline scheme in hybrid-moveToOffline,
the bits from the address's leaf node to the root are set to 0. In hybrid-checkRAS,
the tree is traversed in either a depth-first or breadth-first manner to determine which
addresses are in the offline scheme. The appropriate bits are reset to 1 when addresses
are moved back into the online scheme.
5.3.1 Hybrid Add and Remove operations
The operations hybrid-add(a, v, f) and hybrid-remove(a) could be added to the
interface in Figure 5-3. hybrid-add adds an address to the online scheme if f (flag)
is 1, and to the offline scheme if f is 0. hybrid-remove checks to determine if the
address to be removed is in the online or offline scheme; the address is then removed
from the appropriate scheme.
* For hybrid-add,
- If the address is being added to the protection of the online scheme, the
appropriate nodes for the address and its STATUSBIT are added to the
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partial-hash tree, with the STATUSBIT being set to 1. The address can be
operated on with hybrid-store and hybrid-load. The address's value
can be moved to the offline scheme using hybrid-moveToOffline.
- If the address is being added to the protection of the offline scheme, it
is added as described in Section 4.4.1. The appropriate nodes for the
STATUSBIT and leaf node for the address are added to the tree, with the
STATUSBIT being protected by the tree and set to 0. The address can be
operated on with hybrid-store and hybrid-load. hybrid-checkRAS can
be used to move the address's value to the online scheme.
* For hybrid-remove,
- If the address to be removed is currently being protected by the online
scheme, the appropriate nodes for the address and its STATUSBIT are re-
moved from the partial-hash tree.
- If the address to be removed is currently being protected by the offline
scheme, it is removed with respect to one of the manners described in
Section 4.4.1. The appropriate nodes for the address and its STATUSBIT
are removed from the partial-hash tree.
5.3.2 Space Considerations
We provide some discussion on the space layout of the hybrid scheme. To implement
the hybrid scheme the layout of data values, STATUSBITS, hashes and time stamps
should be determined. Data values should be stored at the addresses, as usual.
Given an address, it should be easy for the checker to compute the location of its
STATUSBIT. When the checker reads either the data value at an address or the
address's STATUSBIT, it is likely to be more efficient if the checker reads both from
the storage together.
Given an address it should be easy for the checker to compute the location of its
time stamp. Also, given a node in the hash tree, it should be easy for the checker to
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compute the location of its parent.
For memory, one possible space layout would be for the part of the storage that
is addressable by the FSM (i.e., the part which would store data values) to be at
the top of the storage. The non-FSM-addressable part of the storage would contain
STATUSBITs, internal hash tree nodes, and time stamps. For storage in a file system
or database, the STATUSBITs and time stamps could be part of a data object's meta
data. The internal hash tree nodes could be in the non-FSM-addressable part of the
storage.
Compared with the hash tree described in Chapter 3, the extra space overhead
is the STATUSBITS and time stamps. As described in [6], the size of a time stamp
can be small, relative to the size of a hash. Thus, the space overhead of the hybrid
scheme should not be much larger than that of the online scheme.
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hybrid-moveToOffline(a) move address a to the offline scheme.
1. Call pht-isAddressPresentInTree(a).
(a) If false, a is already present in offline scheme. Thus, simply return to the caller.
(b) If true, a is present in online scheme. a must be moved to the offline scheme.
i. Call v = pht-load(a) to check integrity of the data value stored at a.
ii. Call v = pht-moveFromTree(a). (Steps can be performed at the same time,
using a cache, so logarithmic cost of using the hash tree is incurred once.)
iii. Call offline-add(a,v).
hybrid-store(a, v) stores v at address a.
1. Read STATUSBIT pertaining to address a. If STATUSBIT is 1, a is in the online scheme.
(a) Call pht-isAddressPresentInTree(a). If it returns true, continue; otherwise,
return an error to the caller.
(b) pht-store(a, v). (Step can be performed at the same time as the previous step
so logarithmic cost of using the hash tree is incurred once.)
2. if the STATUSBIT is 0, a is in the offline scheme.
(a) Call off line-store(a,v).
hybrid-load(a) loads the data value at address a.
1. Read STATUSBIT pertaining to address a. If STATUSBIT is 1, a is in the online scheme.
(a) Call pht-isAddressPresentInTree(a). If it returns true, continue; otherwise,
return an error to the caller.
(b) v = pht-load(a). (Step can be performed at the same time as the previous step
so logarithmic cost of using the hash tree is incurred once.)
(c) Return v to the caller.
2. if the STATUSBIT is 0, a is in the offline scheme.
(a) Call v = offline-load(a, v).
(b) Return v to the caller.
hybrid-checkRAS(Y) returns true if and only if the storage (currently being used by the offline
scheme) has behaved correctly; each of the addresses in Y is moved back into the tree.
1. Call offline-checkRAS(). In Step 4 of offline-checkRAS, if a E Y, do not put it
into bag T. Instead,
(a) Call pht-moveToTree(a, v), where v is the data value at a.
2. If Step 1 returned true, return true; otherwise return false.
Figure 5-3: Hybrid Offline-Online RAS Checker (Hybrid Checker)
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Chapter 6
Implementation
Now that we are familiar with the various schemes for integrity verification, we will de-
scribe an implementation of all three schemes and measure their relative performance
advantages. Integrity verification is relevant in several different contexts including
untrusted memory, network file systems, and databases. Previous experiments [10]
have presented hardware mechanisms to verify the integrity of memory in a secure
processor.
We will now examine the software architecture of SecureDB, an implementation of
the three integrity verification schemes as they are applied to databases. SecureDB is a
C++ library which can be quickly and easily incorporated into any application which
currently makes use of the Berkeley DB embedded database. SecureDB provides
secure get() and put() operations which will verify the integrity of all data stored
in a database. It can be configured to use the online, offline, or hybrid schemes
for integrity verification. SecureDB is compatible with the Berkeley DB API 4.1.25
and simply requires that all Berkeley DB get() and put() calls be replaced with calls
to SecureDB's sget() and sput() calls, respectively. Like Berkeley DB, SecureDB
supports the storage and retrieval of key/value pairs of arbitrary length.
Thousands of applications utilize Berkeley DB to provide fast, scalable, and reli-
able data management. Berkeley DB is integrated into such programs as Sendmail
and MacOS X Server and is in use by companies such as Akamai, Alcatel, Ama-
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zon.com, AOL, AT&T, Cisco, Google, HP, Motorola, and Sun.
6.1 Models and Assumptions
SecureDB was written with two models in mind, as shown in Figure 6-1. SecureDB
assumes that Berkeley DB is running in client-server mode on untrusted storage. In
this mode, the database server accepts requests via IPC/RPC, and issues calls to
the Berkeley DB interfaces based on those requests. The database server is the only
application linking the Berkeley DB library into its address space. The client-server
model trades performance for protection. Since the size of the hash tree created
by SecureDB is dependent on the number of items being protected, the hash tree is
stored on a remote NFS server. Traversal of the tree requires communication between
SecureDB and the NFS file server. The SecureDB server can handle requests from
multiple clients, such as a PDA, via a simple get/put interface.
3erver
ee) -- --
Single Trusted SecureDB Server SecureDB Client/Server model
Figure 6-1: SecureDB Models
The two models differ in that, in the first, SecureDB runs on a single trusted
server with a limited amount of memory. The trusted SecureDB server is responsible
for maintaining the hash tree and the root hash. In the second model, SecureDB
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is split into a client and server application. The trusted SecureDB client maintains
the root hash, while the untrusted SecureDB server maintains the entire hash tree.
The advantage of the former scheme is that we can guarantee that the hash tree has
been constructed properly, eliminating the possibility of a denial of service attack
(data element does not exist). In the latter scheme, more complicated algorithms are
required to protect against denial of service since we are unable to guarantee that our
code is run properly on the untrusted server.
6.2 Design Goals and Metrics
SecureDB was created with the following design goals in mind:
* Strong security: system should be secure and should detect all
corruption or tampering of the untrusted store.
* High reliability: system should perform reliably and should
database operations on behalf of the user program.
instances of data
reliably perform
* Low client-side memory requirements: we assume clients have only a limited
amount of memory.
· Low communication overhead: communication between client and server should
be kept at a minimum.
We can formalize the above goals as the algorithmic goal of minimizing the fol-
lowing:
* space used by the data structures maintained by client and server
* time required to get/put elements from the database
* amount of data required to get/put elements from the database
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6.3 Data Structures
The online and hybrid schemes both require the use of a hash tree. A hash tree
stores the elements of a set in the leaves of the tree. All internal nodes contain a
collision-resistant cryptographic hash (typically MD5 or SHA-1) of the child nodes.
In SecureDB, an open-source implementation of SHA-1 is used. The ordering of the
leaves and all connectivity information in the tree must be known by the client so
that the client can recompute and validate the hash value for the root.
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the offline scheme must maintain a data structure
to track which keys are under its protection. This data structure can be unprotected
and stored on untrusted storage. Tampering of the data structure will be detected by
the checkRAS() function. SecureDB maintains a timestamp database which serves
a dual purpose. First, as its name implies, the timestamp database maintains all
the timestamps for every key being protected by the offline scheme. Second, the
timestamp database is used to determine which keys are protected by the offline
scheme.
Hash trees have previously been created using a variety of data structures including
binary trees, 2-3 trees, and skip lists [12, 16]. Other variations on hash trees have
been proposed in [3, 11]. The SecureDB implementation makes use of a 2-3 tree as
its primary data structure.
6.4 2-3 Trees
In our implementation, we use 2-3 trees, despite warnings by Naor and Nissim that
dynamic 2-3 trees are non-trivial to program correctly [16]. Our 2-3 tree implementa-
tion supports dynamic addition but not dynamic deletion of elements. As described
above, each leaf stores an element while each internal node contains a hash of its
children's values. In a 2-3 tree, each node can have exactly two or three children,
which are classified as being a left child, a middle child, or a right child.
2-3 search trees are part of a larger classification of data structures called dictio-
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naries, which support insertion, deletion, and searching of key/value pairs. 2-3 search
trees were first introduced in 1970 as an improvement to balanced binary trees and
were later generalized to B-trees. They were later simplified to form red-black trees
[5].
2-3 trees maintain the following invariants:
* All data appears at the leaves
* Data elements are ordered from left to right
* Every path through the tree is the same length
* Interior nodes have two or three subtrees
Figure 6-2: A 2-3 search tree. Data elements appear in the leaves while meta-data is
stored in interior nodes [5].
6.4.1 Searching
A tree with N data items will always have a height between log3N and log102N. Search-
ing requires a single traversal along a path from the root to a leaf, and is thus bounded
by the height of the tree. Interior nodes do not contain data but rather contain meta-
data about the keys stored in the nodes' subtrees. Each interior node contains an
mlow and low field, indicating the smallest key in the middle and right subtrees,
respectively. These are used to efficiently traverse the tree and locate a desired key.
Searching requires only traversing those subtrees that contain the desired element.
The complete searching algorithm is given in [5].
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6.4.2 Insertion
Insertion into a 2-3 tree can be a complex process and involves two different cases.
Insertion involves finding the correct location for insertion, splitting nodes if necessary,
and finally updating meta-data along a path from the newly inserted leaf to the root.
Every element can be inserted into one and only one correct location since elements
must remain ordered from left to right. Finding this location involves using the meta-
data to traverse the tree from the root until the appropriate leaf node is found. If
the parent has just two children, then insertion is relatively painless. We can simply
determine if the new element should become the left, middle, or right child, and adjust
the meta-data along a path from leaf to root accordingly.
If, however, the parent of the leaf already has three children, then additional work
is required. The three children and the new element to be inserted must be split into
two interior parent nodes, each having two children. The exact location of the split
depends on the key being inserted and must maintain the property that elements
should remain ordered from left to right. After all interior node values have been
updated, the newly created parent node with its two children can be attached.
If the preceding level in the tree also already has 3 children, then this process of
splitting nodes must continue until a node with just two children is found. If the
insertion propagates to the root of the tree, it is possible that a new root must be
created to accommodate the new node.
6.5 HashTree class
The 2-3 tree described above was implemented as a C++ class. The HashTree class
consists of a root node and supports the dictionary operations insert() and find ().
Each node element in the tree contains a key, the corresponding data value, the hash
of the node's children, a status bit, and pointers to the left, middle, and right children.
HashTree provides the following public API:
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* get();
* getRoothash();
* getStatusBit();
* insert();
* moveToOffline();
* getNextQupule();
* printout();
6.5.1 Qupules
Qupules are the primary structure used to communicate information from the HashTree
on the server to the client. As client-server communication is typically via an RPC
mechanism, it is imperative that pointers in the server's memory space not be re-
turned to the client. Instead, actual data values must be returned to the client. This
is achieved through use of the Qupule. A Qupule sent from the server to the client
contains the data values for the left, middle, and right child, the hash of the three
children (parent hash), and positioning information indicating where the Qupule is
attached to the parent. The client can traverse the tree upwards, toward the root,
by calling getNextQupule(). The client must initiate a traversal by first calling
initiateInsert () and passing the key of a node from which traversal should begin.
6.5.2 Client-Server Synchronization
Insertion of a new key/value pair by a user program requires two things to occur.
First, the client must simulate the insertion and calculate a new root hash, making
sure to verify that all values it uses in the calculation have not been tampered with.
The client does this through the repeated use of Qupules from the point of insertion
to the root. The verification and insertion are done in parallel to minimize the cost
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of traversing the tree. The client maintains an oldHash and newHash during the
traversal, using the old hashes for verification. After the client has calculated the
new root hash, the server must also perform the insertion and update its hash tree to
reflect the addition of the new element. After an insertion operation has completed,
the client and server root hashes should match.
Communication between the client and server is currently simulated. Every time
the client must communicate with the server, an NFS read is performed. The amount
of data read is intended to accurately approximate the data that must be transferred
from the server to the client. Network latency and available bandwidth can signifi-
cantly affect the performance of the three integrity verification schemes, whether or
not simulated RPC calls are used.
6.5.3 Hybrid Strategy
The client can dynamically employ one of several strategies for determining which
data should be moved to and from the offline scheme and when. A client with knowl-
edge of its data access patterns would typically protect frequently used information
with the offline scheme and less frequently used data by the online scheme. If the
client is performing a sequence of operations before returning a result, then the data
required for the computation can be protected by the offline scheme. When the data
access pattern is not known, a reasonable solution is to move data from the online
to the offline scheme each time it is used. This strategy works well where there is a
high degree of temporal locality. SecureDB leaves the choice of strategy up to the
client. Data can be moved to the offline scheme via calls to hybridMoveToOffline ().
Forcing an integrity check by calling checkRAS() results in all data being moved back
to the protection of the online scheme.
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6.6 Implementation Notes
SecureDB consists of five source files and their corresponding header files: securedb.cpp,
online.cpp, offline.cpp, hybrid.cpp, tree.cpp, and util.cpp. The SecureDB source
files were integrated into OpenLDAP 2.1.23 in the /servers/slapd/back-bdb di-
rectory and compiled with gcc 2.96. Several modifications were required to the
OpenLDAP source code. Specifically, the file init.c contains the following line
which initializes SecureDB and specifies the integrity verification scheme to be used:
initsecuredb(ONLINE);
All instances of db->put and db->get were replaced in id2entry. c with calls to
sget and sput, passing all of the original parameters. Prior to inserting or retrieving
elements from the database, the check procedure is called (in the offline and hybrid
scheme only) to determine whether an integrity check is required.
OpenLDAP can be compiled and installed using the accompanying Makefiles.
After the slapd daemon has been installed, it can be configured by modifying the
slapd.conf file located at /usr/local/etc/openldap/.
A series of scripts to start, stop, populate, clean, and dump data from the OpenL-
DAP server are available.
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Chapter 7
Performance
In an attempt to gauge the relative performance of the three integrity verification
schemes, a series of carefully controlled tests were performed. The goal of the exper-
iments was to determine the performance of each scheme under real workloads. As
discussed in Chapter 6, each scheme was implemented and then tightly integrated
into the Berkeley DB embedded database.
OpenLDAP 2.1.23 was selected to measure the performance of the three schemes
and was modified minimally to make use of SecureDB. OpenLDAP is a commercial-
grade, full featured, open source implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP). OpenLDAP was determined to be a suitable candidate for our tests
as it is widely used, its source code is freely available, and its performance is heavily
affected by the performance of Berkeley DB.
7.1 What is LDAP?
LDAP was developed as an efficient way for PCs to access complex directories based
on the X.500 global directory standards. The X.500 standard was overhead intensive
and led to the development of LDAP to greatly simplify access to global directories.
After the Internet Engineering Task Force's adoption of LDAP, it quickly became the
preferred solution for all types of directory services applications running over IP.
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The complete LDAP specification for LDAP vl, v2, and v3 can be found in RFC
1487, 1777, and 2251, respectively. LDAP v3 adds increased security (SASL and
SSL), allows for multiple LDAP servers to handle requests, and adds support for
international characters.
LDAP directories are frequently used for global corporate directories, e-mail con-
tact lists, telephone directories, and user authentication, but its use is not restricted
to these applications.
7.1.1 How LDAP directories work
Directories are typically read more often than they are written. LDAP directories
are hierarchical, beginning at the root with a global name, working down to increas-
ing detail such as employee names, ID numbers, divisions, contact information, etc.
LDAP fields are called attributes and begin with a Distinguished Name (DN), an
Organizational Unit (OU), a Common Name (CN), and finally an attribute type and
attribute value.
Directory information may be accessed from a PC or other client device and
may be used to search email directories, network administration directories, customer
directories, product catalogs, etc. The LDAP API is widely used and supported and
can be accessed from C, C++, Java, JavaScript, Perl, and many other platforms.
Microsoft Active Directory is also LDAP compliant.
7.1.2 OpenLDAP and BerkeleyDB
OpenLDAP makes extensive use of BerkeleyDB in order to maintain its databases of
directory information. OpenLDAP maintains one database (dn2id. c) of key/value
pairs mapping DNs to IDs and a second database (id2entry. c) mapping IDs to
directory entries. In order to make use of the SecureDB API, only a few changes
to the OpenLDAP source were required. Upon database initialization, a call to
init_secure_db() was required to initialize SecureDB and specify the integrity ver-
ification scheme to be used. The calls to db->get () and db->put() were replaced
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with calls to sget () and sput 0(), respectively, passing the same parameters as before.
In order to get the SecureDB C++ library to compile with OpenLDAP's C source,
minor tweaking was necessary and gcc 2.96 was required.
7.2 DirectoryMark Test Framework
7.2.1 Platform
The tests were run on a Dell Intel system with:
* 2 x 733 MHz Intel Pentium processors (256K L2 cache)
* 256 MB RAM
* 18 GB Maxtor ATA IDE disk
* RedHa-l; Linux 2.4.20-8smp kernel
7.2.2 Test Method
The primary testing was conducted using Mindcraft's DirectoryMark 1.3 test suite.
DirectoryMark provides a Solaris client and supports multiple multithreaded client
processes, allowing a single system to simulate many clients. For our tests, only a
single client with a single thread was used. The client executed a prepared script
of 1000 LDAP operations, generated by the DirectoryMark test suite. Queries were
executed continuously without any delay between operations, until the entire script
had completed once.
The DirectoryMark Perl scripts were modified so that:
* The inetOrgPerson schema is correctly used
* The correct attribute type is used for "unique identifier" matches
* The seeAlso field is inhibited as its syntax was incorrect (does not have DN
syntax)
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7.2.3 Test Scenarios
A test script containing 1000 LDAP operations was used for all tests. The test
script contained a mixture of operations intending to simulate an e-mail / messaging
server using a directory server, individual clients looking up names in an address
book or expanding a group for e-mail, and an administrator making modifications to
the directory. Searches consisted of exact UID matches, CN wildcard searches, and
non-existent entries. The test scenario consisted of additions (17.5%), modifications
(15.6%), comparisons (11.7%), and searches (55.2%). Binds were performed after
every 5 operations.
Tests were performed with databases containing 1000, 5000, and 10,000 entries.
Prior to each test, the following steps were performed:
* The directory was started.
* The directory was populated "over protocol" using ldapadd.
* Each entry was read once to "warm" the entry cache.
* The specified test was run.
7.2.4 DirectoryMark configuration
The DirectoryMark test suite with detailed instructions is available from
http://www.mindcraft.com/directorymark/.
OpenLDAP must be populated with properly formatted entries from an LDIF
file. An LDIF file containing an arbitrary number of entries can be created using
the dbgen.pl script. A 5000 entry LDIF file can be created by executing perl
dbgen.pl -v -x o=example.com -o .. /Ldif/data5000 5000. The LDIF file must
be concatenated with the appropriate LDIF header as specified in the DirectoryMark
instructions.
Once the LDIF file has been created, the test script must be generated. It is
imperative that a new test script be created for each LDIF file, as the script is
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dependent on the contents of the directory. Test scripts can be produced using the
scriptgen. pl tool:
Usage: scriptgen2.pl [options] outputname ldif-file num-transactions
The following command produces a script similar to the ones that were used for
testing: perl scriptgen2.pl -b -v -i -a 35 -m 30 -c 25 -w 25 -n 25 -u 20
-g 25 -s 7 -X 8 -B 5 ../Scripts/data5000 ../Ldif/data5000.ldif 1000
Once the appropriate server name and desired test script are specified in the
DirectoryMark config file, the test suite can be run. The general procedure followed
between tests was:
* Kill existing slapd daemon using killLDAP.sh.
* Clean residual files left by previous instance of slapd using cleanLDAP.sh.
* Start new instance of slapd daemon using startLDAP.sh.
* Populate LDAP server using populateLDAP.sh.
* Dump contents of directory using dumpLDAP.sh.
* Run DirectoryMark test suite from Solaris client.
7.3 DirectoryMark Results
The DirectoryMark test suite was run against an OpenLDAP server employing one of
the three integrity verification schemes. An unmodified OpenLDAP server was also
tested. Tests were conducted to determine the effects on performance of the number of
entries in the database, and for the offline and hybrid schemes, the checking frequency.
The period between integrity checks is indicated by the value of T, the number of
get/put operations prior to a check being forced. A longer T value indicates less
frequent checks. Performance was measured in terms of absolute time in seconds and
in DirectoryMark Operations Per Second (DOPS). The average time for each search,
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add, modify, and compare operation in milliseconds was also recorded. All data can
be found in Appendix A.
Table 7.1 illustrates how the various schemes performed in decreasing number of
DOPS. The number of entries was held constant at 1000, while the scheme and check-
ing frequency were varied. As expected, the unmodified LDAP server performed the
best while the offline scheme with frequent checks performed the worst. Unexpectedly,
the hybrid scheme performed poorly when compared to the offline scheme. Possible
reasons for the poor performance of the hybrid scheme will be discussed below. When
checks were infrequent (T=50000), the offline scheme resulted in 39% fewer DOPS
when compared to an unmodified LDAP server. The offline scheme, however, outper-
formed the online scheme by 31%, while the hybrid scheme outperformed the online
scheme by 19%. In the worst case, when checks were frequent (T=500), the hybrid
scheme was 185% slower (65% fewer DOPS) than the online scheme. With frequent
checks, the offline scheme was 101% slower (50% fewer DOPS).
Scheme T RPC (k) Time (s) DOPS
Unmodified - - 30 33.3
Offline 50000 100 49 20.4
Offline 10000 150 52 19.2
Hybrid 50000 400 54 18.5
Online - 1500 64 15.6
Hybrid 10000 900 69 14.5
Offline 1000 500 82 12.2
Offline 500 900 129 7.8
Hybrid 1000 5700 178 5.6
Hybrid 500 5700 183 5.5
Hybrid 100 5700 257 3.9
Offline 100 4400 817 1.2
Table 7.1: DOPS for various checking periods (T) 1000 entries
7.3.1 Checking frequency vs. performance
The performance of the offline scheme is bound solely by the overhead required to
perform a check operation. The check operation requires updating the TAKEHASH
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and the PUTHASH for all items in the database. This operation is computationally
and communications intensive as the entire database must be read. Therefore, the
frequency of checks can have a significant impact on the performance of the offline
scheme as illustrated in Figure 7-1.
Comparison of Offline and Hybrid Schemes for Various Checking Periods
Z.U
20.0
15.0
V)
a.
a
10.0
5.0
0.0
Figure 7-1: Comparison of Offline and Hybrid Schemes for Various Checking Periods
(T = 50000, 10000, 1000, 500, 100) 1000 entries. (longer bars are better)
Performance of the offline scheme degrades rapidly as the checking period is de-
creased, suggesting the use of long checking periods to maximize performance. Long
check periods, however, result in delayed tamper detection, which may or may not be
an issue depending on the situation.
Similarly, the performance of the hybrid scheme is also affected by the checking
period. The offline scheme outperforms the hybrid scheme which must traverse the
hash tree to locate the correct STATUSBIT and must also perform the same check
operation as the offline scheme. The hybrid scheme shines when an optimal strategy
for moving data to the protection of the offline scheme is selected. When database
accesses occur at random, however, no such optimal strategy is possible. The hybrid
scheme outperforms the offline scheme when temporal locality is high. Our tests
exhibited little to no temporal locality, resulting in poor performance of the hybrid
scheme.
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7.3.2 Effects of large data sets on performance
In order to determine the scalability of each of the three integrity verification schemes,
each scheme was tested with an increasing number of database entries. Tests were
performed for 1000, 5000, and 10,000 entries. More than 10,000 entries could not be
tested due to the length of time involved to execute each test. A test with 100,000
entries would require 5 hours to initially populate the database over protocol. One
million entries would require a population time in excess of 80 hours, even on an
unmodified OpenLDAP server.
Scaling from 1000 entries to 10,000 entries resulted in an 8.3x slowdown for the
unmodified server. The online scheme scaled the best, with a 10.4x slowdown, as
its running time is logarithmic. The offline scheme with T=10,000 exhibited a 16x
slowdown, while the hybrid scheme resulted in a 36x slowdown.
Comparison of Three Schemes for 1 K, 5K, 10K Entries
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Figure 7-2: Comparison of Offline, Online, and Hybrid Schemes for 1000, 5000, and
1000 Entries (T=10000). (longer bars are better)
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7.3.3 Search, add, modify, and compare operations
The DirectoryMark test suite consisted of four types of operations: Additions (17.5%),
Modifications (15.6%), Comparisons (11.7%), and Searches (55.2%). Searches re-
quired the most amount of time as they typically required accessing large portions
of the database. Figure 7-3 shows the relative time spent executing comparisons,
modifications, and additions. Search time is shown in Figure 7-4.
Avg. Time for Add, Modify, and Compare
Operations for 5000 and 10000 Entries
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Figure 7-3: Avg. Time for Add, Modify, and Compare Operations for 5000 and 10000
Entries (T=10000).
Avg. Time for Search Operations for 5000 and 10000 Entries
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Figure 7-4: Avg. Time for Search Operations for 5000 and 10000 Entries (T=10000).
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7.3.4 Loading over Protocol
Typically, direct tools are used for loading the OpenLDAP directories as this is signif-
icantly faster. Since SecureDB was not integrated into the direct tools (slapadd), the
database had to be populated "over protocol" using the ldapadd tool. Loading over
protocol requires that the OpenLDAP server be running, while direct loading makes
modifications to the databases backing the directory directly. Direct population of
a database is not always possible, so the performance of loading over protocol is a
relevant and interesting measure.
Load measurements were taken for populating a database with 1000, 5000, and
10000 entries. Populating an unmodified server with 100,000 entries would have
exceeded 5 hours and 1,000,000 entries would have exceeded 80 hours. As expected,
the unmodified server performed the best, while the offline scheme once again proved
to be the best of the three integrity verification schemes. The results for 10,000 entries
is shown in Figure 7-5, and the complete results can be found in Appendix A.
Loading 10000 Entries Over Protocol (T =100000)
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Figure 7-5: Time required to load 10000 entries over protocol (T=100000).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
We have presented three schemes for integrity verification of untrusted storage. The
online scheme is in wide use today, while the offline and hybrid schemes are a new
approach designed to outperform the use of hash trees alone. The SecureDB system
was implemented in order to measure the performance of the three schemes when
subjected to a real-world workload.
The offline scheme resulted in 39% fewer DOPS when compared to an unmodified
LDAP server. The offline scheme, however, outperformed the online scheme by 31%,
while the hybrid scheme was only 19% faster than the online scheme in the best case.
In the worst case, when checks were frequent, the hybrid scheme was 400% slower
(75% fewer I)OPS).
Unfortunately, the hybrid scheme did not perform as well as expected due to
the inability to accurately predict data access patterns generated by random LDAP
queries. The overhead of the hybrid scheme can be reduced by selecting an optimal
strategy for moving items to the protection of the offline scheme. When the data
access pattern is known, selecting an optimal strategy is easy. However, when data
accesses occur at random, finding the optimal strategy is significantly more difficult
and can lead to poor performance of the hybrid scheme.
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8.1 Future Work
The schemes presented focus on tamper detection while ignoring the issue of recovery.
Additional work is required to integrate a system such as SecureDB with new or
existing schemes for data recovery in the event of tampering or data corruption. In
the future, we plan to investigate recovery techniques for data stored on untrusted
storage in a database. One possible approach is to use backup disks and the client
cache to restore data affected by an adversarial attack.
While integrity verification focuses on tamper detection, SecureDB could also be
modified to provide encryption to prevent adversaries from reading data stored on
untrusted storage. Encrypting data is essential for widespread adoption of SecureDB.
Offline integrity checking is useful for applications such as certified execution and
memory protection on memory constrained devices. The hybrid scheme can be used
as an alternative to hash trees for file systems and databases. For the hybrid scheme
to truly be advantageous, an optimal strategy must be devised for moving data to the
protection of the offline scheme in the presence of random accesses. Alternatively, the
hybrid scheme may offer performance advantages if implemented at a higher level,
say, the block or file level. This would give order to accesses which appear to be
random at the key/value level.
The current implementation of SecureDB supports a single client and only sim-
ulates real client/server communication. For SecureDB to be truly useful it must
provide mechanisms for data recovery and encryption and must be reworked to pro-
vide true client-server support.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Scheme Entries RAS Populate(s) Dump(s) RPC (k) checkRAS Search (ms) Add (ms) Mod (ms) Cmp(ms) Total(s) DOPS
Unmodified 1)00 - 26.733 1.852 - 43 16 8 2 30 33.3
Unmodified 5000 151.668 2.1 - 186 18 7 2 119 8.4
Unmodified 1000 - 369.931 2.081 - 438 23 14 6 250 4.0
Offline 1000 50000 28.958 4.866 100 2 135 6 5 2 49 20.4
Hybrid 10)00 50000 27.438 4.841 400 2 89 15 7 2 54 18.5
Online 1(00 - 29.13 4.754 1500 - 105 16 9 3 64 15.6
Offline 1000 10000 29.567 4.716 150 16 85 16 7 2 52 19.2
Hybrid 1000 10000 28.914 4.637 900 14 116 17 7 2 69 14.5
Offline 1(00 1000 30.493 4.966 500 162 139 15 7 2 82 12.2
Hybrid 1(00 1000 28..835 5.015 5700 143 312 16 7 2 178 5.6
Offline 1(00 500 27.225 4.874 900 371 222 16 6 2 129 7.8
Hybrid 1000 500 27.157 5.086 5700 287 321 19 10 4 183 5.5
Offline 1)00 100 26.742 4.958 4400 2044 1439 16 117 1 817 1.2
Hybrid 1000 100 28.281 4.927 5700 1451 456 17 8 2 257 3.9
Online 10000 - 384.673 2.119 18600 - 1179 24 14 8 660 1.5
Offline 10000 100000 374.025 2.213 1600 14 845 36 26 12 479 2.1
Hybrid 10000 100000 336.02 2.149 9200 13 1227 25 13 5 686 1.5
Offline 10(00 10000 360.919 2.023 4000 134 1459 30 53 5 821 1.2
Hybrid 10(00 10000 338.311 1.93 64900 132 4489 72 51 40 2495 0.4
Offline 10000 1000 671.766 1.957 24300 1157 8026 26 11 7 4439 0.2
Online 5000- 142.744 2.284 8700 - 541 21 9 9 307 3.3
Offline 5000 10000 166.365 1.959 2000 136 687 25 8 2 386 2.6
Hybrid 50)00 10000 152.585 2.048 16300 66 1047 20 7 2 584 1.7
Offline 10000 Infinite 395.159 1.61 817 33 23 6 462 2.2
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